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Abstract. In this paper, the literature on the interaction between monetary and
fiscal policies in a monetary union is surveyed. By adopting the concept of symbiosis
as a starting point, the paper highlights the importance of uncertainty, policy makers’
preferences and targets. Then, the role of commitment to policy rules and coordina-
tion is addressed. The analysis also focuses on the importance of the data considered
for the generation of the policy mix. As a final step, the paper discusses the main
results in the literature on public debt management in a monetary union. All the
reported theoretical results are then adopted to retrieve policy and institutional im-
plications for the European Monetary Union.
Keywords: Economic shocks; EMU; Monetary and fiscal policies interaction; Mon-
etary union; Policy mix
1 Introduction
With the beginning of European Monetary Union (EMU), a vast literature has adapted
macroeconomic theories to analyze various policy design issues in multi-country frame-
works. Among these, one of the most relevant is the study of the interaction between
a centralized monetary policy and many decentralized fiscal policies. As easily pre-
dictable, this literature had its most flourishing period in the beginning of the 2000s.
Nevertheless, the global financial crisis, the macroeconomic imbalances within the
EMU and the sovereign debt crisis in some member countries have raised questions
concerning the targets of the ECB, the degree of policy coordination within the EMU,
the enforcement of fiscal rules and the commitment of policy makers to their assigned
objectives. This has prompted a renewed interest in the theoretical literature studying
monetary and fiscal policies interactions in a monetary union, as it provides possible
1
answers to such questions and permits to evaluate the ongoing process of redesigning
the institutional structure underlying the formation of the policy mix in the EMU.
This paper aims at analyzing the most relevant aspects concerning the interaction
between monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union in order to highlight their
policy and institutional implications for the set-up of a well-designed currency union.
The studies that have analyzed the literature on monetary and fiscal policies in-
teraction so far have focused mainly on the case of a stand-alone country and have,
sometimes, analyzed multi-country arrangements only as a special case (see for in-
stance Canzonieri et al., 2011). It has to be noted, however, that the problems con-
cerning the policy mix in a monetary union are for large part different from the case of
a stand-alone country. Beetsma and Debrun (2004) present a review of the literature
on the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union stressing
that "...given the vast and fast expanding literature on the topic, it is impossible to
be exhaustive in any discussion".
Therefore, in this paper, the selective review on the topic is presented paying
more attention to the recent developments in the literature and focusing on some
relevant aspects that are not covered in previous studies. Nevertheless, some overlaps
necessarily occur in order to allow a self-consistent discussion of the topic.
First, the paper presents a generic theoretical framework that is the cornerstone for
setting up an interaction model between monetary and fiscal authorities in a monetary
union, and it is therefore able to encompass and generalize most of the modeling
solutions established in the literature. Then, based on different specifications of the
general theoretical framework, the paper highlights how uncertainty, policy makers’
preferences and targets play a crucial role in the determination of the policy mix
outcome. Subsequently, the role of commitment to policy rules and coordination
among policy makers is studied. The analysis also focuses on the importance of
the data (national and union-wide) considered for the generation of the policy mix.
Then, as the last step of the analysis, the paper discusses the management of public
debt and the risks of insolvency in a monetary union. The presentation of these
aspects has been designed also with the aim to provide the reader with a broad
range of modeling solutions without compromising the level of homogeneity of the
analysis. The reported theoretical results are also used in order to retrieve policy and
institutional implications for the EMU.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the generic theoretical frame-
work for the analysis of the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities in a
monetary union. Sections 3 to 7 retrieve the solutions of the models under different
assumptions and specifications in order to reproduce and discuss the main results in
the literature. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 The Common Framework
As argued by Davig and Gürkaynak (2015), central banks have been increasingly
considered as residual claimants of policy. This means that, on top of their usual task
of controlling inflation, central banks have been charged with additional policy duties
not fully addressed by other policy makers. According to the authors, this is also the
result of the excessive focus on optimal monetary policy, rather than on the optimal
policy mix. However, the central bank, with its single policy instrument, cannot
control the multiple inefficiencies that characterize the economy as these inefficiencies
require multiple policy makers with multiple objectives. Therefore, in order to reduce
the likelihood of ill designed policies and institutions, theoretical modeling should
focus on the optimal policy mix and on the interaction between fiscal and monetary
authorities.
In a monetary union, such interaction is commonly modeled following a simple
game theory approach in which monetary policy is conducted by a central bank, while
fiscal policy is fractionated among the governments of each member country. Their
preferences can be represented as:
LM = h(zM) (1)
LF,i = g(zF ) (2)
where Equation (1) represents the loss function of the central bank. Assuming that
the monetary union is formed by n member countries, Equation (2) represents their
governments’ loss functions with i ∈ {1, ....,n}. zM and zF are the sets of relevant
variables for the authorities, which are not necessarily the same for the central bank
and the governments. Despite the fact that large part of the literature strictly fo-
cuses on the interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities, in addition to these
economic agents some studies also consider private agents’ behaviour. In this case,
the preferences of the representative agent j in country i can be added to the model
by means of a payoff function:
Uj,i = q(zJ) (3)
Again, zJ is the set of relevant variables for the representative private agent. All the
players optimize their objective function with respect to the variable they directly
control1 subject to a set of constraints Z, linking the variables in zM , zF and zJ and
representing the surrounding economic scenario. Large part of the literature specifies
the interaction game in a linear-quadratic form, meaning that the functional form for
the players’ payoffs (h, g and q) is quadratic, while Z is a set of linear equations. When
the model is specified on the basis of Equations (1) and (2), it allows only for fiscal
spillovers in the monetary union, while the extended version, including also Equation
(3), allows taking into account also possible spillovers between private agents.
Assuming simultaneous choices, the solutions of the optimization problems in the
extended model provide the best reaction functions for the central bank (CBrf ), for
the governments (Grfi ) and for the private agents (PA
rf
ji ):
CBrf = χ(zM , zF , zJ) (4)
Grfi = ζ(zM , zF , zJ) (5)
PArfji = ξ(zM , zF , zJ) (6)
The set of Equations (4) and (5) represents how each policy authority reacts in re-
sponse to the others’ economic policy maneuvers and to the changes in the economic
scenario.
The equilibrium of the game is then obtained solving the system formed by the
best reaction functions of all the players. Moreover, the evaluation of the aggre-
gate payoff function (3) at the equilibrium can be adopted in order to assess the
welfare implications of alternative policies interactions. When the model does not
directly involve private agents, social welfare is measured by a micro-founded social
loss function (see for instance Dixit and Lambertini, 2003b; Lambertini, 2006; Galí
and Monacelli, 2008; and Ferrero, 2009). As in most of the cases this function results
in a combination of (1) and (2) (see Lambertini and Rovelli, 2004; Cavallari and Di
Gioacchino, 2005), the total social welfare can also be addressed by measuring the
authorities’ loss at the equilibrium. This is the welfare criterion adopted in this paper.
3 Symbiosis of Fiscal and Monetary Policies, Pref-
erences and Uncertainty
The starting point to analyze the main results in the literature is the concept of
symbiosis between monetary and fiscal authorities that has been introduced by Dixit
and Lambertini (2001 and 2003a). Symbiosis implies that if the authorities share the
same preferences, the targets can always be attained independently of the details of
the institutions. The central bank’s loss function can be written as:
LM =
1
2
(pi − piM)2 + 1
2
n∑
i=1
βMi (yi − yMi )2 (7)
where pi is the inflation rate and it is assumed to be unique in the whole union,
piM is the central bank’s inflation target, yi is the output level in each country, and
yMi represents the output targets of the central bank for each member country. The
parameter βMi represents the relative weight that the monetary authority assigns to
the stabilization of output (in each member country) with respect to the stabilization
of inflation. Following the same line, the loss function of the government in country
i can be written as:
LF,i =
1
2
(pi − piFi )2 +
1
2
βFi (yi − yFi )2 (8)
where piFi and yFi are, respectively, the targets of inflation and output for government
i, while βFi represents the government’s preference for output stabilization.
It is assumed that policy makers do not face any kind of uncertainty. Moreover,
each country’s fiscal policies inflict externalities on other countries, and the common
monetary policy has its time-consistency problem. Then, the economy is modeled
with the following set of equations:
yi = yi +
n∑
w=1
kiwfw + bi(pi − pie) (9)
pi = pi0 + c
n∑
i=1
fi (10)
Equation (9) represents the determination of the output in each country. In this equa-
tion yi can be interpreted as natural level of output in country i, kiw is the parameter
of the effects on the output of country i’s fiscal policy (fw with w = i) and (for w 6= i)
it also represents the spillovers effects from other countries’ fiscal maneuvers. The pa-
rameter bi reflects the sensitivity of the output to the gap between observed inflation
and its expectations (pie). Equation (10) explains how the common level of inflation
is determined in the union2. It is based on the assumption that inflation is a sum
of the component pi0, which represents its part controlled by monetary policy, and a
further contribution arising from national fiscal policies according to the parameter
c3.
Under a similar specification, Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) show that with iden-
tical output and inflation targets, there is a mutually beneficial interaction, defined in
the literature as a symbiosis between monetary and fiscal policies. As a result of this
symbiosis the common targets of inflation and output are always attained. To show
this result, it is necessary to assume that the targets are the same for each authority:
piM = piFi = 0, y
M
i = y
F
i = y
T ∀i. (11)
According to this specification, the targets of all the authorities coincide and, for
the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the common inflation target is zero. In
this specification of the model, the n fiscal authorities and the common central bank
act simultaneously and non-cooperatively. The central bank minimizes LM choosing
pi0 and takes fi as given. Each government i sets its fiscal policy fi in order to
minimize LF,i, taking pi0 and all other fiscal choices fw (with w 6= i) as given. All the
authorities minimize their loss functions subject to Equations (9) and (10), therefore
the first order condition for the central bank is:
n∑
i=1
βMi (yi − yT )bi + pi = 0 (12)
While the first order condition for each fiscal authority is:
βFi (yi − yT )(kii + cbi) + cpi = 0 (13)
The system represented by Equations (12) and (13) has its unique (Nash) equilibrium
solution with yi = yT for all i and pi = 0. This implies that the solution of the game
is obtained when the output and the inflation attain their target levels (pi∗ = 0
and y∗ = yiT ). Moreover, by plugging this solution into Equations (7) and (8) it
can be shown that it is ideal for all the authorities as it implies that their bliss
points are all achieved (LsymM = L
sym
F,i = 0,∀i). The same result can be obtained in
an extended version of this model considering also private agents. Kempf and von
Thadden (2013) prove this by adding to this model a private agents’ payoff function
U = −1
2
(pi−pie)2. Also in this case, symbiosis provides the best possible equilibrium,
as the bliss points of all players are achieved (LsymM = L
sym
F,i = U
sym = 0,∀i). The
most important feature of symbiosis is that the social optimum is obtained despite
disagreements about the weights of the objectives, despite the order of moves, without
coordination and irrespective of commitment to policy rules as the analysis of all other
equilibria follows the same lines and all yield the common ideal outcome (see Dixit
and Lambertini, 2003a). In relation to coordination and commitment, Kempf and
von Thadden (2013) define this result as the irrelevance proposition.
Therefore, according to symbiosis, the only relevant aspect is the concordance
on the targets between the authorities. Once the concordance is achieved, these
targets will be naturally attained irrespectively of any other institutional structure.
This offers very appealing theoretical elements for the institutional architecture of a
monetary union, and it suggests that most of the main concerns for the EMU may be
irrelevant. The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (and further
reforms) restrain fiscal policies in order to impose a certain level of coordination and
minimize the impact of externalities. Moreover, symbiosis also suggests that a strictly
committed central bank, like the ECB, seems to be unnecessary as well. According to
the results reported, these limitations should not be needed. Obviously this conclusion
would be relevant for the EMU only if symbiosis between national governments and
the ECB holds.
Unfortunately, symbiosis holds only under some essential features of the model. In
the model presented, the authorities share the same variables in their loss functions
and they agree on the most desirable level of output in each country and on the most
desirable level of inflation. Moreover, it has been assumed that all the shocks are
observed and that authorities do not face any type of uncertainty. Therefore, these
assumptions can be relaxed in order to elucidate their role.
The assumption of the lack of uncertainty is very important in order to obtain
a symbiosis between fiscal and monetary policy. It is worth noting that, due to
the linear-quadratic nature of the game, the introduction of unobserved additive
shocks into Equations (9) and (10) does not affect the optimal policies set under
average outcomes. Nevertheless, multiplicative (or parameter) uncertainty can affect
the symbiosis in the strategic interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities.
Multiplicative (or parameter) uncertainty imposes a stochastic nature on one or more
of the parameters in the model (see Holly and Hughes Hallett, 1989). Di Bartolomeo
and Giuli (2011) and Di Bartolomeo et al. (2009) assume that the authorities set their
policies on the basis of the model formed by Equations (7)-(10), but they are aware
that uncertain deviations from this model can occur4. Under this assumption, the
model becomes stochastic and multiplicative uncertainty is implemented. In order to
analyze the effects of multiplicative uncertainty, the only modification to the model
regards Equation (10), that should be rewritten as:
pi = υpi0 + µc
n∑
i=1
fi (14)
According to Equation (14), policy uncertainty is introduced with the assumption that
policy makers may not have full knowledge of the effects of their instruments on the
level of inflation. Therefore, they do not exactly know the value of some parameters,
as only the distributions of these parameters are known. This is introduced in the
model with the fact that unobserved shocks can affect fiscal (µ) and monetary (υ)
policy effectiveness. The stochastic nature of shocks is modeled as follows: µ ∼ (1, σ2µ)
and υ ∼ (1, σ2υ). Di Bartolomeo and Giuli (2011) assume that µ = 1 and explore the
case of uncertainty about the parameters of the monetary policy effectiveness. They
show that in the absence of uncertainty (σ2υ = 0) symbiosis holds and the targets are
attained (y∗ = yT and pi∗ = 0). On the contrary, under multiplicative uncertainty
(σ2υ 6= 0) the achievement of ideal output and inflation is not guaranteed anymore. An
increasing level of uncertainty raises inflation and reduces output. In the absence of
uncertainty, the common targets are always obtained and coordination is not relevant
because there is only one policies combination that guarantees the achievement of the
shared targets. The explanation for this result is that when outcomes are random,
a conflict between policy makers emerges because their targets on average are no
longer a common objective. Average outcomes are optimal for the fiscal authorities
that do not face any uncertainty, but they are not optimal for the central bank. The
conflict also implies that the Nash equilibrium is no longer efficient and coordination
between policy makers is needed. These results are robust with respect to different
shocks structures and to the timing of the game. Similar results are obtained when
multiplicative uncertainty affects only fiscal policy (see Di Bartolomeo et al., 2009).
To obtain this it must be set that µ ∼ (1, σ2µ) and υ = 1 in Equation (14).
Therefore, it can be concluded that multiplicative uncertainty about the effects of
policy maneuvers does not permit the achievement of the targets in the equilibrium
and symbiosis does not take place.
Another circumstance in which symbiosis does not necessarily occur is when fiscal
and monetary authorities consider different variables in their loss functions. In this
case it is not possible to have an agreement on the targets. This phenomenon can be
evidenced by modifying one of the loss functions in the model. This can be shown
following Lambertini (2004) and Lambertini et al. (2007), where the fiscal authorities
have the following loss function:
LF,i =
1
2
[
(pi − piFi )2 + βFi (yi − yFi )2 + 2φifi
]
(15)
Therefore, in this specification national governments consider the fiscal stance (fi) as
an additional variable in their preferences. The central bank’s loss function is still
represented by (7) and the economy is modeled according to Equations (9) and (10).
Under this structure, the first order condition for each fiscal authority becomes:
c(pi − piFi ) + βFi (yi − yFi )(kii + bic) + φi = 0 (16)
While for the central bank is:
(pi − piM) +
n∑
i=1
βMi bi(yi − yMi ) = 0 (17)
It is easy to show that in this case the outcome pi = piM = piFi = 0 and yi = yFi =
yMi = y
T does not satisfy the first order conditions and cannot be a solution of the
game. Under this agreement about the targets, the first order conditions (16) and
(17) are satisfied only if φi = 0 for all i. Therefore, symbiosis occurs only if the fiscal
authorities do not consider the fiscal variable in their loss functions, and then all the
authorities in the monetary union share the same variables in their preferences.
The last assumption that can be removed is the one of common target values for
the central bank and the governments. In the case of conflicting objectives between
the monetary and fiscal authorities, Dixit and Lambertini (2000 and 2001) show that
the equilibrium outcomes do not coincide with the bliss points and that they depend
on the details of the institution, such as the commitment to a rule and the order of
moves. The importance of the difference in the targets of the authorities is also ana-
lyzed by Demertzis et al. (2004) who stress that the conflict arising when authorities
pursue their goals independently becomes stronger when preferences diverge (see also
Hughes Hallet and Viegi, 2002). These results are easily obtained from the model
formed by Equations (9) and (10) and by the loss functions (7) and (8) assuming
that piM 6= piFi and yM 6= yFi . Under these circumstances the equilibrium levels of
inflation and output do not coincide with the targets of any authority5. In the case
of divergent targets, symbiosis is not verified due to a non-cooperative race between
the authorities that try to achieve discordant levels of output and inflation.
Symbiosis provides very appealing results for the institutional building of a mone-
tary union, but it has to be noted that the three assumptions that have been relaxed
in this section are very unlikely to happen all together in reality. First, the institu-
tional architecture in the EMU separates the targets of the ECB and the objectives
of national governments. The ECB is supposed to be concerned about inflation as
its first objective, while fiscal discipline is a direct concern of single governments. A
natural representation of this framework would not lead to a coincidence between
the variables in the loss functions of the monetary and fiscal authorities. Second,
economic policy uncertainty is difficult to measure, but there is a large consensus on
the fact that such circumstance can occur (see, for instance, Bloom, 2009; Bachmann
et al., 2013; Baker et al., 2013). Moreover, in multi-country arrangements the effects
of monetary policy are less predictable by the central bank, as the reaction to mone-
tary shocks can differ between countries (see for instance Clausen, 2001; Calusen and
Hayo, 2006). Third, economic and political heterogeneity across member countries
also makes it very difficult to have fully concordant targets in practice.
Thus, the most relevant implication for these evidences is that symbiosis does
not apply in reality and that the degree of commitment to a rule and discretion, the
level of coordination, the order of moves and other characteristics of the interaction
game, they all matter and require attention when the interaction between monetary
and fiscal policies in a monetary union is analyzed. Nevertheless, symbiosis is still
important because it serves as a benchmark for other solutions of the game since it
is able to provide an equilibrium corresponding to the social optimum in which the
bliss points of all agents are achieved.
4 Discretion Versus Commitment
There is a vast literature comparing the outcomes of monetary policy under com-
mitment and discretion in a single country (see Walsh, 2010 for an overview of this
literature). Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a, b) show
that surprise inflation, following the temptation to raise output above its natural
level, generates an inflation bias. Then, the commitment of the central bank to a
monetary policy rule is the natural solution as it eliminates the monetary authority’s
possibility to generate surprise inflation. Other solutions to this bias have been pro-
posed, and they can be obtained under inflation targeting (Svensson, 1997 and 1999),
with the provision of an optimal contract and incentives (Persson and Tabellini, 1993;
Walsh, 1995), if the monetary authority is conservative (Rogoff, 1985b and Lohmann,
1992)6. One of the limitations of these contributions is that they do not take into
account the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy. Among others, Dixit and
Lambertini (2003b), Hughes Hallett et al. (2007) and (2009) fill this gap analyzing
the outcomes under different combinations of discretion and commitment for the fiscal
and monetary authorities in a single country framework. In this part of the literature
it is shown that, taking into account the interaction in the policy mix, the outcomes
can differ from the case where monetary policy is considered alone. This kind of
analysis is easily adaptable to a monetary union framework. It can be assumed that
the economy is still represented by Equations (7) and (8) and the authorities’ loss
functions are still represented by (5) and (6). In this specification it is not assumed
that the monetary and fiscal authorities share the same targets; thus the assumption
(9) is not kept. Moreover, the central bank is assumed to be at least as conservative
as the fiscal authorities in all respects. Therefore:
piM < piFi , β
M
i ≤
1
n
βFi , y
M
i < y
F
i ∀i. (18)
When all the authorities act discretionarily, under the assumption (18) the inflation
and output in the Nash equilibrium are the following:
pi∗ =
piM −∑ni=1 zipiFi −∑ni=1 βMi bi(yFi − yMi )
1−∑ni=1 zi < pi
M −∑ni=1 zipiM
1−∑ni=1 zi = piM < piFi ∀i.
(19)
y∗i = y
F
i −
c
βFi (cbi + kii)
(pi − piFi ) > yFi > yMi ∀i. (20)
where zi =
βMi
βFi
bi
bi+kii/c
> 0 under the assumption that c and all kii are positive. In
other words, the outcome is more extreme than the ideal points of all policy makers,
and it results in a too high output and a too low inflation. This result highlights
how discordance in the targets does not allow symbiosis to occur. This happens
because there is a non-cooperative race between the authorities. Fiscal authorities
try to achieve output beyond the central bank’s ideal, while the monetary authority
aims at an inflation rate that is below the fiscal authorities’ ideal. This conflicting
situation results in an equilibrium where the level of inflation is too low and the level
of output is too high. This equilibrium is not desirable because individuals will have
a low level of leisure and excessive debt and higher interest rates will occur. It is
worth noting that if zi > 1n , the Nash equilibrium still provides a policy mix bias but
with inverted deviations, as a too low output and a too high level of inflation occur.
These results synthesize the general evidence in the literature that full discretion
provides an equilibrium that is not consistent with the ideal levels and a policy mix
bias occurs. Then, by plugging Equations (19) and (20) into (7) and (8) it can be
shown that full discretion does not imply the social optimum as the bliss points of the
players are not achieved (LdisM > 0 and LdisF,i > 0,∀i). Therefore, under discretion the
loss of all the authorities will be higher than the one obtained when symbiosis occurs
(LdisM > L
sym
M = 0 and L
dis
F,i > L
sym
F,i = 0,∀i). Furthermore, the more the priorities
of the central bank and of the governments differ, the more their policies will be
conflicting and the larger the policy mix bias (see also Demertzis et al., 2004).
Having a conservative central bank suggests that a possible solution to the policy
mix bias could be monetary policy leadership. In all the specifications analyzed so far,
it has always been assumed that none of the authorities could act as a leader, Dixit
and Lambertini (2001) study monetary leadership by assuming that the central bank
chooses its monetary instrument before that fiscal policies are implemented. They
show that under full discretion, monetary leadership can perform better than Nash
equilibrium, but still does not provide the target values. In the case of discretionary
monetary leadership the inflation rate results to be above the weighted average of the
targets of all authorities by an amount that depends on the gap between the ideal
outputs of the fiscal authorities and of the central bank7. The outcome is then non-
optimal, but it is not as extreme as the one from the discretionary Nash equilibrium
reported in Equations (19) and (20). Therefore, under monetary leadership the social
optimum is not achieved, but the distance to the optimal welfare is lower. Then, it
can be concluded that under monetary leadership the losses of all the authorities, LcblF,i
and LcblM , are lower than in the full discretion case, but do not achieve the bliss point
(LdisM > LcblM > L
sym
M = 0 and L
dis
F,i > L
cbl
F,i > L
sym
F,i = 0,∀i).
Following the conclusions drawn by the literature on the inflationary bias emerging
from discretionary monetary policies, the natural solution should be the commitment
of the monetary authority to a rule. However, taking into account the interaction
between fiscal and monetary policies allows for three different possible solutions. The
first option is the one of full commitment, in which all the authorities commit to policy
rules. Alternatively two partial commitment solutions are possible, one in which only
the monetary authority commits to a rule and another where only the fiscal authorities
are committed. In case of partial commitment in which only the monetary authority
follows a policy rule, it is like the central bank announces its policy function before
expectations are formed. Therefore, under rational expectations, choosing the level
of pi0 can be regarded as choosing the level of pie. Under this specification, Dixit
and Lambertini (2001) show that this arrangement provides the same outcome as the
discretionary monetary leadership. This implies that the commitment to a rule by
the central bank improves the solution if compared to the case of full discretion, but
does not outperform the case of discretionary monetary leadership (LdisM > LcblM =
LcbcomM > L
sym
M = 0 and L
dis
F,i > L
cbl
F,i = L
cbcom
F,i > L
sym
F,i = 0,∀i). This is due to the
fact that the beneficial effects of the monetary commitment are totally nullified by
the discretionary fiscal policies in the union, as the latter act as a constraint for
the monetary rule. Then, fiscal policy regulation can improve the performance of
monetary commitment (or leadership), as it can shift the fiscal reaction functions in
order to achieve more desirable combinations of inflation and output. Furthermore,
according to Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) countries in a monetary union should also
have incentives to adhere to a fiscal rule as it allows governments to internalize the
long-run benefits of reducing the debt in terms of lower future inflation. This has
been one of the arguments supporting the Stability and Growth Pact.
Therefore, the equilibrium that is potentially able to avoid the policy mix bias is
the one of full commitment to policy rules in which also fiscal authorities adhere to a
rule. Intuitively, when the authorities fix their targets according to policy rules, agree
on them, and are concerned about the same variables, the outcome of full commitment
provides the attainment of these targets. In such a case, the coalition consisting of
all authorities is able to reproduce the situation in which symbiosis occurs and the
social optimum (or bliss point) is achieved (LcomM = 0 and LcomF,i = 0,∀i).
Provided that full commitment allows avoiding any policy mix bias, a relevant
question concerns the optimal level of commitment. Hughes Hallett et al. (2007)
agree with the conventional wisdom on the fact that full commitment is the most
desirable arrangement, but they enrich this conclusion analyzing the required degree
of commitment. They find that a certain degree of commitment is required in order
to uniquely obtain the desired outcome for each authority. This minimum degree is
a positive function of other authorities’ degree of commitment, level of impatience
of the authorities and the structure of the economy. Moreover, the optimal level of
commitment is not necessarily the same for all the authorities. They show that unde-
sirable scenarios can be avoided when monetary commitment is sufficiently stronger
than fiscal commitment.
Although additive shocks have not been formally considered so far, it is worth
noting that they play an important role in the commitment to a rule by policy makers.
As highlighted by Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) and Dixit (2000), large and asymmetric
shocks make it difficult to sustain a commitment rule. Therefore, the authors suggest
that some degrees of flexibility are required in order to make the rules sustainable
under severe asymmetric shocks. The degree of flexibility, however, is a very sensitive
aspect especially for fiscal policy rules, as according to the degree of freedom fiscal
policy can reduce both the central bank’s commitment and conservativeness (see
Dixit, 2001; Andersen, 2008).
The results highlighted in this section have some important institutional impli-
cations for the setting up of a monetary union. Provided that the assumptions that
trigger symbiosis are very unlikely to occur in reality, the lack of rules and full discre-
tionary policies should provide a policy mix bias in which the final outcome diverges
from the initial targets. To avoid the results of this non-cooperative interaction, the
formulation of policy rules is extremely needed. In the institutional framework of the
EMU it is clearly stated, through a hierarchical mandate, that the ECB is intended
to be a conservative monetary authority and fiscal rules, like the ones in the Stability
and Growth Pact, have been considered as a necessary requirement. Nevertheless, the
constraints on the conduct of fiscal policy and the convergence criteria have shown to
be insufficient to implement a proper rule mechanism on the fiscal authorities’ choices.
According to the models presented in this section, this scenario can undermine the
beneficial effects of the central bank’s conservativeness and harm national economies
in the long run. The implementation of mechanisms able to enforce a fiscal rule is
then crucial in order to achieve the targets and to avoid divergent macroeconomic
dynamics in a monetary union. Therefore, the reform of the Stability and Growth
Pact should be pointing in this direction. Still, the flexibility of fiscal rules is also a
necessary element in order to facilitate the management of asymmetric shocks and
potential financial turbulence by national governments (see also De Grauwe and Ji,
2013b and 2013c; De Grauwe and Foresti, 2016).
5 Coordination and the Role of Spillovers
Under coordination joint decisions are taken by the policy makers. Coordination takes
place when it is able to increase the satisfaction of each authority by eliminating the
costs imposed by purely selfish decisions. The bargaining power of each authority
determines how far its interests are met in the final equilibrium8. Before analyzing
the main results in the literature on coordination in a monetary union, it is worth
distinguishing between coordination and commitment. According to the definitions
in the present study, commitment assumes that the authorities agree on a rule and
respect it, while coordination means that the authorities set their policy jointly by
taking into account each other’s perspectives. Then, commitment implies that the
authorities adhere to a rule, but their decisions can be taken separately; while under
coordination the authorities set the policy mix together without adhering to a policy
rule. Therefore, the main difference is that coordination does not necessarily affect
expectations as in case of commitment. Banerjee (2001) provides a clear distinction
between these two cases.
In a monetary union there are two coordination problems. The first one concerns
the coordination between the fiscal stance of the single governments (horizontal co-
ordination problem). The second problem refers to the vertical coordination between
one centralized monetary policy and many decentralized fiscal policies. Therefore
there are two main coordination arrangements. One is the case of full coordination
(both vertical and horizontal coordination occur simultaneously) and the other in
which only horizontal coordination takes place.
Under full coordination, the central bank cooperates with the coordinated fiscal
authorities that can be represented as a single one. This implies that all the authorities
maximize a common loss function that is a weighted sum of their respective loss
functions:
LM,F = ηL
F + (1− η)LM (21)
Buti et al. (2001) show that, under different targets between fiscal and monetary
authorities, the policy mix bias arises and its characterization depends on the bar-
gaining power of the governments (η) and of the central bank (1 − η). They show
that when the fiscal authorities pursue a positive output gap target, the coordina-
tion equilibrium provides a policy mix bias in which inflation and deficit distortions
are experienced. According to the authors, the inflation bias is a positive function
of governments’ bargaining power and output target. Therefore, in the absence of
shocks a conservative central bank has no incentive for full coordination. The same
conclusion is drawn by van Aarle et al. (2002a) with a dynamic game. The authors
show that full coordination induces a loss on the central bank, due to the coalition of
governments. Then, the incentives for cooperation depend on the effects of shocks.
In the presence of demand shocks the results are ambiguous and only in the presence
of supply shocks the authors show that full coordination unambiguously provides
welfare gains as in this case the two authorities react moving their instruments in
opposite ways. Therefore, when the authorities have different policy objectives, full
coordination suffers the same problems highlighted in the previous section. The only
difference is that the bargaining power of the authorities determines the actual policy
mix bias.
Referring to the importance of vertical coordination, it should be of no interest
for the EMU as the ECB is not allowed to coordinate with the single countries’ fiscal
decisions. Although recent monetary policy arrangements have evidenced that under
particular conditions the ECB may overcome this constraint, it does not imply that
the ECB will coordinate with national governments in the policy mix.
In case of horizontal coordination only a sub-set of players (fiscal authorities)
decide to act together. This immediately relates to a general conclusion of game
theory models suggesting that when coordination takes place only between a sub-set
of players, it could lead to such an adverse reaction of the outsiders that all players
would gain by not coordinating (see Rogoff, 1985a). In the presence of exclusively
horizontal coordination, the outsider is the central bank. Therefore, in this scenario,
the existing literature suggests that horizontal, without vertical, coordination may re-
sult to be counterproductive as it triggers an adverse reaction of the common central
bank. However, some of the peculiar features of monetary unions make horizontal
coordination beneficial under determined circumstances. They involve the symme-
try of shocks and the spillovers between member countries. Beetsma et al. (2001),
with a two country version of the model of Buti et al. (2001), show that horizontal
coordination can be counterproductive in the presence of highly correlated shocks,
because they increase the impact of time inconsistency in fiscal policies and they al-
low a stronger (counterproductive) reaction of the central bank. Then, they argue
that since in a monetary union the presence of asymmetric shocks reduces the central
bank’s intervention, fiscal coordination increases its desirability the more asymmetric
the shocks are (the same conclusion is drawn by van Aarle et al., 2002b). Ferré (2005)
also argues that horizontal coordination can be beneficial as it makes countries less
sensitive to shocks leading to lower levels of public deficits.
The general result that horizontal coordination increases its performance when
economies are structurally different is also confirmed by Hughes Hallett (2005) and
(2008). The author investigates the importance of horizontal (although rule-based)
coordination by assuming different sequential arrangements for the interaction game.
He also explores the effects of giving the fiscal authorities a Stackelberg leadership,
showing that the first-mover advantage allows governments to exploit the free-riding
problem and shift the burden of stabilization on the central bank, resulting in a ben-
eficial coordination. He concludes that fiscal leadership is the best outcome because
it is able to minimize the conflict between policy makers without any need for a less
independent central bank (see also Hughes Hallett and Ma, 1996). Other authors
agree with the general conclusion that fiscal leadership can reduce the policy mix
bias, but only under specific circumstances. Lambertini and Rovelli (2004) agree
with this conclusion, but they assume that governments should adopt a loss function
that takes into account also the objective of price stability. Debrun (2000) shows
that fiscal distortions can be eliminated with fiscal leadership, as long as output does
not enter as an exogenous term in the central bank’s preferences. Kirsanova et al.
(2005) show that fiscal leadership provides a better outcome, when compared with
the Nash equilibrium, if the central bank is benevolent and fiscal authorities aim at an
excessive level of output. These results are very important for the EMU as according
to Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) it may be characterized by fiscal leadership rather
than monetary leadership. The authors argue that governments have a first mover
advantage because, once the fiscal stance has been decided, they have no chance to
react to subsequent monetary decisions and this rigidity replicates a commitment
technology.
Also Kempf and von Thadden (2013) mainly rely on fiscal leadership in order to
study the effects of horizontal coordination. Specifically, this study permits to analyze
the effects of horizontal coordination by taking into account also the effects of both
spillovers between private agents and fiscal spillovers. In order to formally consider
private spillovers, the starting point of the model is now the payoff function of the
representative private agents as:
Uj,i = −1
2
(aji − pi)2 − a0
2
u2i −
b0
2
pi2 − c0
2
τ 2i (22)
where aji is the nominal wage chosen by private agent j, then (aji − pi) is a measure
of the individual real wage. The level of economic activity is now addressed by
the aggregate unemployment in country i (ui), while τ represents dead-weight losses
associated with the use of the fiscal instrument. If τ is a lump-sum instrument the
dead-weight losses disappear as it implies that c0 = 0.
The loss function of fiscal authorities is obtained by the average of the payoff
functions of the m private agents:
LF,i = − 1
m
m∑
j=1
Uj,i (23)
While the loss function of the central bank is:
LM =
n∑
i=1
LF,i (24)
The economy is represented by a single equation:
ui = u+
1
m
m∑
j=1
(aji − pi)− τi − 1
n− 1
n∑
w=1,w 6=i
biwτw (25)
Therefore, the realized unemployment rate depends on the union-wide real wage mea-
sure 1
m
∑m
j=1(aji − pi) and fiscal actions of all governments. Private spillovers are
considered if m > 1, while fiscal spillovers are introduced when biw 6= 0.
The solution of this model under fiscal leadership highlights that a monetary union
can clearly benefit from horizontal coordination. To show this result, the solution of
the model is retrieved assuming c0 > 0, m > 1 and biw 6= 0. Furthermore, without
loss of generality the solution is obtained by also assuming that private spillovers have
their maximum effect (m→∞). The solutions of the game under fiscal coordination
(26) and non-coordination (27) are the following:
uco = (1− Φco)u; pico = aco = a0
b0
uco; τ co =
Φco
1 + biw
u (26)
unc = (1− Φnc)u; pinc = anc = a0
b0
unc; τnc =
Φnc
1 + biw
u (27)
where:
Φco =
a0(1 + biw)
2(1 + a0
b0
)
a0(1 + biw)2(1 +
a0
b0
) + c0
; Φnc =
a0(1 + biw)(1 +
a0
b0
1+biw
n
)
a0(1 + biw)(1 +
a0
b0
1+biw
n
) + c0
; (28)
Comparing Equations (26) and (27) it can be verified that the number of fiscal
players (n) determines the difference between the two equilibria as it affects only
the outcomes under fiscal non-coordination. This result leads to the question how
the gains from fiscal cooperation will be affected by changes in the number of fiscal
players. To make this concern operational, the two equilibrium outcomes have to be
compared in terms of welfare. The relevant welfare measure for this evaluation is cap-
tured by the evaluation of Uj,i. This is consistent with the welfare measure adopted
so far as the level of Uj,i directly determines also LM and LF,i at the equilibrium out-
comes. Then, by using Equations (22), (26), (27) and (28) it can be easily shown that
δ(Ucoj,i−Uncj,i )
δn
> 0. This means that the welfare gains from fiscal coordination (relative to
non-coordination) increase as the number of countries n increases. Intuitively, with
the costs associated with distortionary fiscal instruments occurring at the national
level, there emerges under non-cooperation a free-rider problem vis á vis the monetary
policy, and this problem gets worse as the number of countries becomes larger. This
result is in line with the conclusion of Chari and Kehoe (1990) that cooperation will
be beneficial for countries, even if their number becomes arbitrarily large, when they
face distortions which will not be removed as the market power of countries goes to
zero.
The fundamental aspects of the model that determine this result are the assump-
tion of distortionary taxes (as opposed to lump-sum taxes) and the presence of private
and fiscal spillovers. The beneficial effects of horizontal coordination disappear if (1)
fiscal authorities use a non-distortionary instrument (c0 = 0) or (2) there are no pri-
vate and fiscal spillovers (m = 1 and biw = 0). If one of these two conditions applies,
the solution of the game with no coordination will be the same as under horizontal
coordination. Solving for instance the model assuming that c0 = 0, Equation (28)
implies that Φco = Φnc = 1. Then, by using Equations (26) and (27), the solution of
the model becomes:
unc = uco = 0; pinc = pico = 0; anc = aco = 0; τnc = τ co =
u
1 + biw
(29)
Given Equations (22), (23), (24) and (29) it is clear that this solution reaches the bliss
point of all the agents and LM = Li,F = Uj,i = 0 irrespective of fiscal coordination.
Imposing that m = 1 and biw = 0 provides similar results, in the sense that there is no
difference between the solution under horizontal coordination and no coordination.
Nevertheless, it can be shown that under this circumstance the bliss point is not
reached due to the distortionary instrument adopted by fiscal authorities (see Kempf
and von Thadden, 2013). However, as in the case of symbiosis, these two assumptions
seem to be too restrictive and it can be concluded that a monetary union characterized
by fiscal leadership should enhance horizontal coordination as long as governments
use distortionary fiscal instruments and there are fiscal and private spillovers.
Contrary to vertical coordination, horizontal coordination is in the agenda of the
EMU as the article 103 of the Maastricht Treaty stresses that member countries
should coordinate their economic policies within the Council of Ministers. However,
it seems that in practice international policy coordination has not taken the form of
joint decisions, but rather of a mere exchange of information or, at best, informal
agreements on a set of mutually consistent external objectives. This can be explained
by the fact that coordination is costly. In order to have a secured coordination, many
institutions are required and they are all costly (a stable institutional framework,
control instruments, formal meetings etc.). These costs are rarely considered in theo-
retical models, but it is sometimes argued that they can easily more than compensate
the benefits deriving form coordination (see Beetsma et al., 2001). Moreover, the
main results in the literature highlight a serious risk of counterproductive fiscal co-
ordination. This is especially the case when shocks are highly correlated between
countries. Then, from the perspective of the OCA theory (see Mundell, 1961; McK-
innon, 1963; Kenen, 1969), fiscal coordination is most likely to be undesirable when a
set of countries form an optimum currency area. Nevertheless, given the severe asym-
metric shocks that have occurred across the EMU, theoretical models suggest that
strengthening horizontal coordination is a good way to deal with this problem and to
improve the future functioning of the union. In this sense, the setting up of a fiscal
union is intended to increase fiscal coordination (see Schelkle, 2012). Moreover, the
ongoing process of enlargement of the EMU will increase the number of fiscal players
and, as shown in this section, this should increase the potential beneficial effects of
horizontal coordination.
6 National Versus Union-wide Average Data and the
Reaction to Shocks
When a common central bank takes its decisions in a monetary union, it is very
important to assess which type of data have to be taken into account. The most
relevant question is if the monetary authority should adopt union-wide data or if
national characteristics should be considered for its policy making. The relevance of
this question increases dramatically in the presence of economic asymmetries between
member countries as in this case the idea that "one size monetary policy fits all" does
not necessary satisfy the needs of all member countries. In the case of the EMU,
significant differences between member states have been detected. Asymmetries have
been evidenced in inflation, growth and debt (see Angeloni et al., 2005). There is
also evidence of the existence of asymmetries that can generate multiple equilibria
(see De Grauwe, 2012; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013a, Borgy et al., 2014) and divergent
macroeconomic dynamics (see Hancké, 2013 and Foresti, 2015). The question is
whether the central bank should take into account these heterogeneities or not.
The answer coming from the institutional framework of the EMU is negative as
the ECB wants to represent itself as a supranational institution, rather than a board
of several national authorities, in order to minimize the political sensitivities of the
weights in the voting rules (see Alesina and Grilli; 1992 and 1993). Therefore, in its
official pronouncements the ECB has manifested that its monetary policy is conducted
on the basis of union-wide average data. Nevertheless, there is no full agreement in
the literature on this approach. Farhi and Werning (2014) and Benigno (2004) argue
that monetary policy can be chosen at the union level so that monetary conditions
are adapted to the average country. Galí and Monacelli (2008) and Beetsma and
Jensen (2005) agree with this result, but they show that this is optimal only if fiscal
policies pose no inflationary pressures on the union as a whole and stabilize relative
inflation. Furthermore, De Grauwe (2000) and De Grauwe and Sénégas (2006) show
that by using national information the central bank can improve the efficiency of
its policy setting when there are asymmetries in the monetary policy transmission
mechanisms. De Grauwe and Sénégas (2004) follow the same reasoning and show
how the enlargement of the EMU requires that the ECB takes into account national
data as the degree of asymmetry should increase together with the entrance of new
member countries. At the same time, when monetary policy cannot make distinctions
between member countries, the increase in the asymmetries between supply shocks
makes the monetary authority less active (see also Lane, 1996; Gros and Hefeker,
2002; Foresti and Marani, 2013).
In these studies monetary policy is analyzed without directly investigating its
interaction with an optimizing fiscal authority. When the interaction between a cen-
tralized monetary authority and many decentralized fiscal authorities is studied this
issue becomes even more relevant since, as already evidenced in the previous sections,
each government considers its national data in the fiscal policy setting. When the
central bank conducts its monetary policy on the basis of union-wide average data,
the results and the effectiveness of the policy mix on the macroeconomic aggregates
are necessarily affected by this asymmetry. This issue can be tackled following Bofin-
ger and Mayer (2007), where the loss function of the central bank is the following:
LM =
1
2
(pi − piM)2 + 1
2
βMy2 (30)
For the sake of simplicity the output gap target is set to zero. Equation (30) implies
that the central bank takes its decisions on the basis of average macroeconomic data
in the union. The average output gap (y = 1
n
∑n
i=1 yi) is represented by the following
demand equation:
y = y − λρ+ kf + ε1 (31)
Where ρ = r − pi represents the real interest rate and f is the union-wide average
fiscal policy variable (f = 1
n
∑n
i=1 fi). Assuming that monetary policy is credible
(pie = piM), inflation can be modeled by the following supply equation:
pi = piM + αy + ε2 (32)
As shown in Equations (31) and (32), from now on i.i.d. demand (ε1) and supply (ε2)
shocks are formally considered. In this model the central bank’s monetary instrument
is the nominal interest rate (r).Then, the central bank minimizes (30) subject to (31)
and (32), and its best response function is the following:
r =
y
λ
+ piM +
λβM + α
λ(α2 + βM)
ε2 +
k
λ
f +
1
λ
ε1 (33)
Equation (33) represents how the central bank fixes the nominal interest rate as a
function of the average fiscal stance in the union.
Each government sets its fiscal policy on the basis of its national data. Therefore,
the fiscal authorities’ loss function can be written as follows:
LF,i =
1
2
y2i +
1
2
γf 2i (34)
Where γ represents the weight that the primary deficit (fi) have with respect to the
output-gap in the government’s preferences. From Equation (34) it is clear that each
government has a target of 0 for the two variables. Each member country considers
the following national demand equation:
yi = y − λρ+ kfi + ε1,i (35)
Equation (35) assumes the absence of fiscal policies spillover effects and the symme-
try of the demand parameters across member countries. Solving the governments’
optimization problem yields the following best response function:
fi = − yk
k2 + γ
+
λk
k2 + γ
(r − pi)− k
(k2 + γ)
εi,1 (36)
If monetary policy gets more restrictive, the government will switch to a more ex-
pansionary stance. The higher the weight on stabilizing its instrument (γ), the lower
will be the strategic interaction with the central bank. Given its objective function,
fiscal policy reacts only to demand shocks. For instance, following a positive demand
shock, fiscal policy will become more restrictive. There is not a direct reaction of
the fiscal authorities to the union-wide supply shocks as they have an impact on the
fiscal policy only via the central bank’s reaction9. The best response functions (33)
and (36) highlight the main feature of the interaction between the monetary and the
fiscal authorities. The latter conduct their policies on the basis of national shocks,
while the former responds to their union-wide averages.
In the Nash equilibrium the output gap in each country and the common interest
rate are:
y∗i = −
α
α2 + βM
ε2 +
γ
k2 + γ
(εi,1 − ε1) (37)
r∗ = piM +
y
λ
+
1
λ
ε1 +
λβM + α(1 + k
2
γ
)
λ(α2 + βM)
ε2 (38)
When fiscal authorities are concerned only about output (γ = 0), they can completely
stabilize idiosyncratic demand shocks. If fiscal policy exhibits an increasing passive-
ness (increasing γ), cycles are more likely to become non-synchronized. To illustrate
this point, the average demand shock is written as ε1 = ψεi,1 + (1−ψ)ε−i,1 (where ψ
is the GDP share of country i in the union) and it is assumed that a demand shock
hits only country i (ε1 = ψεi,1). Then, the level of output gap in country i and in the
rest of the union can be calculated by using Equation (37):
y∗i =
γ
k2 + γ
(1− ψ)εi,1 and y∗−i = −
γ
k2 + γ
ψεi,1 (39)
Then, the member countries’ equilibrium output is affected asymmetrically by the
shock. Furthermore, the strength of this feedback depends on the GDP share of the
country hit by the demand shock. Asymmetric shocks are a major problem for small
countries participating in the union. In the limit, when the GDP share of an individual
member country (ψ) is almost zero, the shock will be passed through completely if
fiscal policy remains passive (γ → ∞). Then, it can be concluded that fiscal policy
is extremely needed in small countries in order to smooth the impact of shocks.
Therefore, this model confirms the predicament of the OCA theory that monetary
unions function well when demand shocks are highly correlated and fiscal policy
actively stabilizes the business cycles. Equation (38) also shows that when country
i is the only hit by a demand shock, all other member countries are forced to share
the burden of a higher interest rate. The analysis of monetary policy in asymmetric
currency unions changes if the assumption of a common inflation rate is removed.
Benigno (2004), focusing on monetary policy, suggests that the central bank should
target the average level of inflation only if countries show the same degree of nominal
rigidities. If rigidities are not symmetric across member countries, the central bank
should target inflation by assigning a higher weight to the inflation in the countries
with high nominal rigidities. Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006) generalize this concept
and argue that under these circumstances monitoring output gap can provide the
right information on the final target. Concerning the role for fiscal policy, Bofinger
and Mayer (2007) argue that inflation differentials imply diverging real interest rates,
calling for more active fiscal policies in order to smooth out the business cycle. This
is particularly true for small countries, whose idiosyncratic situations are likely to
be neglected by the central bank targeting average data. According to the authors
this supports the idea that, concerning the EMU, the 3% deficit criterion should be
suspended when a country is hit by an asymmetric shock. At the same time, such
fiscal interventions are supposed to affect real interest rate volatility and generate
negative spillovers. These elements support the creation of the Stability and Growth
Pact in order to minimize such spillovers but they also reinforce the evidence for the
need of flexibility in fiscal rules.
7 Public Debt Management and Solvency Risk
Another aspect in which the effects of the policy mix are severely affected by the
asymmetries between union-wide and national data is the management of public debt.
In a broad sense, management of national debts and deficits in a monetary union is a
very sensitive topic as fiscal authorities are supposed to stabilize public debt on their
own. Moreover, the share of public debt stabilization left to single countries increases
when national fiscal authorities do not coordinate (see van Aarle et al., 1997). In
Foresti (2015) the framework of Bofinger and Mayer (2007) is modified in order to
analyze how the interaction between a union-wide data conducted monetary policy
and national data based fiscal policies can affect the management of public debt in
a monetary union. To this aim, the central bank optimization problem can still be
represented by Equations (30), (31) and (32). The fiscal authorities still consider the
national demand Equation (35) but their loss function is now:
LF,i =
1
2
y2i +
1
2
θd2i (40)
In this loss function it is assumed that the governments are directly concerned about
the level of public debt di. Moreover, each fiscal authority knows that the outstanding
level of debt is generated according to the following relation:
di = (1 + ρ)di + fi (41)
The outstanding level of debt in country i is generated by the fiscal stance, by the
debt accumulated before the fiscal maneuver (di), and by the debt service real cost
(ρdi)10. Minimizing (40) subject to (35) and (41), each government obtains its best
response function:
fi = − yk
k2 + θ
+
λk
k2 + θ
(r − pi)− k
k2 + θ
ε1,i − θ
k2 + θ
(1 + r − pi)di (42)
The most interesting aspect of this best response function is obtained by comparing
it with Equation (36), as in Equation (42) δfi
δr
= λk−θdi
k2+θ
. According to Equation
(36), when the central bank performs restrictive monetary policies, the governments
implement expansionary fiscal policies because in that framework they consider only
the restrictive effects of the monetary maneuver on the output gap. However, when
the governments are debt-concerned, they also consider the fact that the restrictive
monetary policy increases their level of debt. Hence, the fiscal authorities face a
trade-off between output gap stabilization and debt stabilization. The higher the
accumulated level of debt (di) and the higher the weight for the debt stabilization
in the governments’ preferences (θ), the more the governments’ fiscal stance reacts
negatively to an increase in the interest rate by the monetary authority. On the
contrary, the higher the impact of the fiscal stance on the output gap (k) and the
reaction of the output gap to monetary policy (λ), the more the fiscal authorities’
fiscal stance reacts positively to a central bank’s restrictive maneuver.
The most relevant part of the solution of the model refers to the optimal level of
debt in country i:
d∗i =
λk
(k2 + θ)(λ+ kd)
(ε1 − ε1,i) + k
2
(k2 + θ)(λ+ kd)
(diε1 − dε1,i) +
+
(di − d)(y + λ)k2
(k2 + θ)(λ+ kd)
+
(k2di + λk)(k
2 + θ)α
(k2 + θ)(α2 + βM)(λ+ kd)θ
ε2 (43)
Equation (43) shows that when there are no supply shocks (ε2 = 0), demand shocks
are perfectly symmetric (ε1 = ε1,i) and the level of existing debt in country i is equal
to the union-wide average (d = di), the fiscal authority in country i is able to reach
its zero-debt target. According to the OCA theory, the situation in which there are
no supply shocks and the demand shocks are perfectly symmetric should be easily
manageable by the policy makers and highly desirable. Nevertheless, in order to fully
exploit the benefits of this situation, it is necessary that the accumulated national
debts converge. If country i has a level of accumulated debt that is higher than its
union-wide average, the equilibrium level of debt in this country will be above the
target. Moreover, the stronger the demand shocks, the more the equilibrium debt in
country i moves away from the target.
Given the authorities’ reaction functions (42) and (33), the origin of this mecha-
nism can be explained by the fact that monetary policy is set on the basis of average
data, then the central bank takes its decisions on the basis of the average accumu-
lated level of debt. On the contrary, national fiscal policies rely on national data and
the fiscal authorities conduct their policies on the basis of the national accumulated
level of debt. Therefore, when the same demand shock occurs all over the union,
the monetary maneuver will not be consistent with the needs of a country with an
outstanding level of debt that is above the union average as the central bank re-
acts considering a lower level of outstanding debt. As a result, the equilibrium level
of debt in this country increases. Gatti and van Wijnbergen (2002) also show that
under symmetric shocks a fiscal coordination failure is triggered when the central
bank targets union-wide average data on fiscal policies. The solution they propose
is that the central bank should implement a reward to governments’ fiscal restraints.
Also Chari and Kehoe (2007 and 2008) support the creation of debt constraints but
they show that under asymmetric structural distortions between member countries,
uniform debt ceilings must be complemented by country-specific debt targets. The
importance of debt ceilings is also supported by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) and
(2005), as they show that national debts can be wastefully accumulated when there
is a conflict between monetary and fiscal authorities.
Another relevant result highlighted by Equation (43) is that member countries
with a debt above the average in the union will not be able to converge to the
target level of debt. On the contrary, divergent equilibria can be experienced and
this can endanger the existence of the monetary union due to the increasing solvency
risk for the highly indebted member countries. When there is a constant increasing
path of public debt in some member countries that increases their solvency risk,
three main scenarios are possible: (1) national governments take care of their public
debt, for instance, by increasing taxation and reducing expenditure; (2) the central
bank monetizes the public debt; (3) default due to insolvency. Cooper et al. (2010)
show that monetization and increase in taxation can arise as possible equilibrium
configurations. The authors show that the element that determines which solution
characterizes the equilibrium depends on the debt distribution in the union. The
more even is this distribution, the more likely is that the central bank will prefer to
avoid a costly default and monetizes the debt of one member country offering a bail
out. Then, this implies the presence of debt spillovers between member countries
as fiscal policies in some member countries may affect the union wide inflation via
monetary policy. Cooper et al. (2014) show that there is no possibility of insulating
the monetary authority from such debt spillovers.
The last important insight from Equation (43) is that differences among member
countries in their level of public debt should be a crucial indicator, more than the
level of debt itself. The more the debt in one country is above the union average,
the more difficult will be its stabilization and the higher the risk of insolvency. This
result contrasts with conventional wisdom that all countries should just prefer to join
a union with low debt members. Also Aguiar et al. (2015) show that, high-debt
countries may be less vulnerable to roll-over crises when belonging to a union formed
by a mix of high- and low-debt members than to one where all other members have
low-debt.
The results presented in this section provide relevant insights for the debate on
the institutional and economic policy arrangements in a monetary union. As long as
asymmetries between member countries will characterize the EMU, it is clear that
the problems highlighted in this section are extremely important and that mech-
anisms able to take into account different national needs in the policy mix (both
in fiscal and monetary policies) should be enhanced. The ECB is a supranational
autonomous institution, therefore it seems very difficult to make the central bank
capable of considering national differences. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the
implementation of unconventional monetary policies should be able to partially solve
this problem. The quantitative easing maneuvers implemented by the ECB seemed
to be a step towards this direction. Nevertheless, as long as this buying program
implies that governments’ bonds are purchased roughly in proportion to the capi-
tal that each member central bank has contributed to the ECB, it will not allow
the common central bank to differentiate between members’ needs. Another point
raised by the models presented in this section suggests that the rationale for the debt
convergence criteria should be reconsidered, as a very important aspect is the gap
between the average accumulated level of debt and its level in single countries. Once
countries with a debt above the union average enter a monetary union, convergence
to targets may never occur. On the contrary, under precise circumstances the debt
gap can increase, endangering the existence of the whole union. For all these reasons
theoretical models suggest that common debt ceilings should be complemented with
country specific targets (see for instance Chari and Kehoe, 2007, 2008) or replaced
by rules responding to a measure of real activity (Ferrero, 2009).
8 Conclusion
In this paper, the theoretical literature studying the interaction between monetary
and fiscal policies in a monetary union has been surveyed and, on the basis of its
most relevant results, some suggestions for the improvement of the functioning of the
EMU have been provided.
Despite the fact that the concept of symbiosis offers very appealing theoretical
elements for the institutional architecture of a monetary union, it has been shown that
it holds only under some assumptions: (1) the authorities share the same variables
in their loss functions, (2) they agree on the target levels and that (3) the authorities
do not face model uncertainty. It has been argued that such assumptions are unlikely
to be verified altogether in reality. For instance, in the EMU architecture the targets
of the ECB and the objectives of national governments are separated. Moreover,
economic and political heterogeneity between member countries makes it also very
difficult to have fully concordant targets in practice and certain degree of policy
uncertainty is always present.
The fact that symbiosis seems to remain a mere theoretical fact implies that the
degree of commitment to a rule and discretion, the level of coordination, the order
of moves and other characteristics of the interaction between fiscal and monetary
policies are all relevant elements able to affect the policy mix outcome in a monetary
union.
Concerning the role of commitment, it has been demonstrated that the lack of rules
and full discretionary policies provide a policy mix bias in which the final outcome
diverges from the initial targets. Therefore, to avoid the results of this non-cooperative
interaction, policy rules seem to be extremely needed. Nevertheless, the presence of
shocks suggests that such rules should be designed in order to allow for some flexibility
in fiscal policy. This result should be a warning for the EMU, where the necessary
fiscal reforms have gone in the direction of more rigid rules.
In relation to policy cooperation, a relevant distinction has been made between
vertical and horizontal coordination. The former should be of no interest for the
central bank due to the result that it may harm monetary conservativism. Despite
the risk of counterproductive fiscal coordination in the the case of highly correlated
shocks between countries, theoretical models suggest that strengthening horizontal
coordination is a good way to deal with severe asymmetric shocks and to improve the
functioning of a monetary union. It has also been shown that the relevance of this
argument increases together with the number of member countries. These results
support the setting up of the fiscal union in the EMU as it is will increase fiscal
coordination.
As a last step, also the potential role of national data in the setting up of the policy
mix has been analyzed. As long as asymmetries between member countries character-
ize a monetary union, mechanisms able to take into account different national needs in
the policy mix (both in fiscal and monetary policies) should be enhanced. It has been
shown that the type of data considered affects the management of debt in the mem-
ber countries. Once countries with a debt above the union average enter a monetary
union, convergence to targets may never occur. On the contrary, when the central
bank takes its decisions on the basis of union-wide average data, the debt gap can
increase endangering the existence of the whole union. By introducing common debt
ceilings complemented with country specific targets, the impact of this phenomenon
should be reduced.
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Notes
1For the monetary and fiscal authorities these are normally assumed to be their policy instru-
ments.
2In the literature it is normally assumed a common level of inflation for the whole union. This as-
sumption is motivated by the fact that member countries are subject to common monetary conditions
as monetary policy is centrally determined. Nevertheless, there is evidence of inflation differentials
in monetary unions (see Honohan and Lane, 2003). However, when countries enter a monetary
union with inflation differentials, the convergence to a common price level determines a differential
in inflation rates (De Grauwe, 2000)
3Without loss of generality the parameter c has been assumed to be constant across member
countries. It is common practice in the literature to assume that kii > 0, c > 0, and bi > 0.
4Although in this study symbiosis has been obtained in a monetary union, it can be shown that
the same results hold in a single country framework (see Lambertini, 2006). Thus, for the sake of
simplicity, the authors consider the case of one country, but their results can be easily extended to
a monetary union.
5The formal derivation of this equilibrium is reported in the next section when the case of full
discretion is analyzed.
6The results of this literature can be considered as one of the motivations behind the strong
orientation towards inflation and conservativism of the ECB. This is oriented towards building
commitment and credibility in central banking as they are considered to be welfare improving.
7Following the same reasoning, it can be shown that in the discretionary fiscal leadership equi-
librium, output is above the weighted average of the targets by an amount that depends on the
difference in the target inflation between monetary and fiscal authorities.
8Bargaining power is normally measured with the inverse of the authority’s loss if the bargain
breaks down.
9Uhlig (2003) shows that under fiscal leadership the governments’ directly react also to the union
supply shocks.
10Possible seigniorage revenues are not taken into account because they are supposed to play an
almost negligible role in a monetary union.
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